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Abstract.  The present research put forth an integrated theoretical framework aimed at providing a more holistic com-
munity-level approach explaining crime across a heavily populated Latino city.  Guided by social disorganization and 
institutional anomie theory, this study used several data sources and OLS regression techniques to examine the impact 
of social disorganization, economic and noneconomic institutional characteristics on rates of property and violent 
crime across 1,016 census block groups in San Antonio, Texas.  While several findings emerged, interactions between 
alcohol density and concentrated disadvantage were significant and positively associated with property and violent 
crime.   Interactions between welfare generosity and concentrated disadvantage were significant and negatively as-
sociated with the outcomes.     
Keywords:  social disorganization; institutional anomie; Latinos; crime; interaction terms; census block groups
Introduction
 For more than half a century, research in the 
ecological tradition has been dominated by social 
disorganization theory (Shaw and McKay, 1942).  This 
theory posits that adverse community characteristics such 
as poverty undermine levels of informal social control, 
which, in turn, fosters crime in urban settings (Sampson 
and Groves, 1989).  While social disorganization scholars 
are credited with explaining why crime occurs across 
different aggregates, a common limitation is that most 
studies have been conducted in settings absent large 
Latino populations.
 Still working in the ecological tradition, a small 
number of social scientists have recently enlisted in-
stitutional anomie theory to study economic (e.g., Gini 
index) and noneconomic (e.g., participation in religious 
engagements) institutional effects on crime (e.g., Maume 
and Lee, 2003).  Developed by Messner and Rosenfeld 
(1994), institutional anomie claims that community-
based economic institutions elevate normlessness (i.e., 
anomie) which produces higher rates of criminal activity; 
however, noneconomic institutions hold the capacity to 
buffer anomic-fueled economic effects on crime.  While 
this theory is able to adjust for a wider array of institu-
tions, the drawback is that studies are conducted at a 
relatively high level of aggregation (e.g., nations, states, 
counties), which limits consideration of community-level 
attributes.
 Despite these shortcomings, the role of social 
disorganization and institutional anomie are salient 
when placed in the context of the systemic network 
thesis.  According to Bursik and Grasmick (1993; see 
also Kasarda and Janowitz, 1974; Kornhauser, 1978), 
all kinds of community and institutional components 
are part and parcel of the private, parochial, and public 
systemic network that represents different levels of social 
control.  The systemic model posits that a broad range of 
community and institutional characteristics affect crime 
indirectly through their effect on informal social control. 
To further illustrate this point, Wilson’s (1987) seminal 
work depicted how macro-structural antecedents (e.g., 
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deindustrialization) impacted the larger institutional fab-
ric of the community—fewer supportive institutions such 
as churches and family stores—which further influenced 
localized social pathologies (e.g., female-headed house-
holds, unemployment, criminals) that undermined the 
development of community oversight.  Peterson, Krivo, 
and Harris (2000) argued that impoverished communi-
ties also experience difficulty attracting and maintaining 
institutions that impede criminal behavior.  The decline of 
supportive institutions may consequently attract uncon-
ventional crime-inducing institutions, such as bars, due 
to little business competition and low rents (Chung and 
Myers, 1999; Lee, 1998).
 While the ecological-crime causal relationships is 
difficult to simplify, the current integrated theoretical 
framework aimed to provide a more informed under-
standing of the wide range of community demographics 
and institutions that act independently and interdepen-
dently (via interaction terms) to influence crime.  Guided 
by social disorganization and institutional anomie theory, 
this study examined the impact of social disorganization 
(concentrated disadvantage), as well as economic (pawn-
shops/music CD-exchange stores, alcohol outlets) and 
noneconomic (welfare generosity, church membership 
rate, Latino culture, voter turnout rate) institutional char-
acteristics on rates of property and violent crime across 
census block groups in San Antonio, Texas.
 San Antonio was selected as the study site based on 
the general omission of Latinos in the criminological 
literature, its large Latino population, and the manner in 
which this population is related to some of the institutions 
of interest.  The city has a 58 percent Latino population, 
yet this ethnic group is predominantly of Mexican origin, 
native-born, disadvantaged, and less educated.  In terms 
of additional Latino specific demographics, Latinos ac-
count for 23 percent of those living in poverty (city 16%), 
18 percent of female-headed households (city 15%), 8 
percent on public assistance (city 9%), and 8 percent with 
a bachelors degree or higher (city 13%).  These figures 
indicate that Latino communities are more disadvantaged 
than the rest of the city.  By all accounts, San Antonio is 
an acculturated city.  The 2000 U.S. Census revealed that 
only 5 percent of the Latino population is foreign-born, 
and 15 percent reported speaking English less than very 
well.  Despite such acculturation, the Latino population 
shows patterns of ethnic enclaves.  According to Allen 
and Turner (2005), 78 percent of Latino population is 
residentially concentrated, but not shaped by immigration 
when compared to other urban areas (e.g., Houston and 
Los Angeles) with modest to large numbers of Latinos.
 Latino demographic characteristics may shape sur-
rounding economic and noneconomic institutions.  For 
example, over 871,000 individuals registered to vote 
during the 2000 Presidential election and approximately 
48 percent participated.  However, Spanish surnames 
accounted for twenty-three percent of the voter turnout. 
One plausible explanation for the low ethnic turnout is 
the poor and less educated population.  Although San 
Antonio’s legacy is rooted in Catholicism, the Glenmary 
Research Center and San Antonio Catholic Archdioceses 
show that from 1990 to 2000 Catholic congregations 
decreased by 32 percent.  Hunt (2000) reported that the 
Catholic Church is losing Latinos to other religions.  In 
2003 the city also experienced a reduction in Section 8 
housing vouchers which caters to a large Latino popu-
lation.  The San Antonio Housing Authority (SAHA) 
currently has over 11,000 residents receiving aid, with a 
waiting list surpassing 5,000.  While it appears that insti-
tutional features of San Antonio likely to help Latinos are 
declining (or are weak), other institutions adversely in-
fluencing Latinos have increased.  For instance, the city’s 
business/assumed names records revealed that 44 new 
pawnshops were established between 1999 and 2003, and 
alcohol serving institutions continue to grow.  Similar 
to other large urban cities, much of the institutions con-
sidered to undermine pro-social values of restraint and 
conformity are located in and around Latino communi-
ties.  In the end, San Antonio is distinctive from other 
large urban cities due to its large, disadvantaged, work-
ing, poor, native-born, Mexican-American communities 
that tend to be residentially concentrated in areas with 
declining political, religious, and welfare institutions and 
increasing crime-inducing institutions.  
 Overall, the unique research setting of San Antonio 
provided a rare exposé into community and institutional 
arrangements of a predominantly Mexican-American 
Latino urban landscape.  Given the rapid growth of this 
ethnic group, it is plausible that other urban cities will 
increasingly come to resemble San Antonio (Guzman, 
2001).  Such locales are likely to be associated with 
unique Latino experiences, as well as various structural 
constraints that have plagued this ethnic group.  This study 
follows Martinez’s (2002) pioneering research, advocat-
ing for criminology that examines the Latino experience 
with the goal of moving beyond the White/Black urban 
crime focus.
Literature Review
 The literature review is divided into three subsec-
tions.  The review begins with social disorganization, fol-
lowed by a discussion on institutional anomie and vari-
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ous competing noneconomic and economic institutional 
dimensions.  The final subsection provides an overview 
of institutional anomie’s moderating concept and existing 
empirical studies.
Social Disorganization
 In their classic work, Shaw and McKay (1942) 
reported that socially disorganized urban communities 
characterized by residential mobility, ethnic heterogene-
ity, and low socioeconomic status were associated with 
crime.  Over the years, theoretical adjustments have been 
articulated and elaborate poverty measures were devel-
oped to better understand the changing social ecology of 
crime across urban settings (see, Duncan and Aber, 1997). 
For example, Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997; 
see also Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush, 2001; 
Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999; Sampson, Morenoff, 
and Earls, 1999) found that high levels of concentrated 
disadvantage, immigrant concentration, and residential 
instability were positively related to violence at the cen-
sus tract level.  Collective efficacy was also reported to 
attenuate the effects of concentrated disadvantage and 
residential instability on violence.  In related studies esti-
mating the influence of social disorganization predictors 
on rates of burglary, researchers found similar direct and 
mediating results (Lynch and Cantor, 1992; Miethe and 
McDowall, 1993; Rountree, Land, and Miethe, 1994; 
Sampson and Groves, 1989; Smith and Jarjoura, 1989).
 Another social disorganization condition that has 
been extensively studied is population turnover (e.g., 
Browning, Feinburg, and Dietz, 2004; Morenoff et al., 
2001).  Consistent with Wilson’s (1987) conception of 
social isolation effect, areas with depleted populations 
may experience higher crime rates due to: (a) an exodus 
of the upper and middle class and (b) citizens who lack 
resources to move choose not to participate in regulating 
community behavior.  Morenoff et al. (2001) found a sig-
nificant negative association between population density 
and homicide across Chicago census tracts.   Based on 
Wilson’s conception of social isolation, Morenoff et al. 
(2001:539) contend that a negative association is more 
applicable at the community-level, whereas a positive 
association is expected at the city-level.  Browning et al. 
(2004) and Morenoff and Sampson (1997) also discovered 
similar inverse relationships.  Furthermore, disorganized 
communities may attract negative, unconventional insti-
tutions, such as alcohol outlets.  Kornhauser (1978:79) 
emphasized the need to focus on the larger institutional 
characteristics of communities as a way to more effec-
tively realize community normative order.  Others have 
recently endorsed this line of inquiry (Hunter, 1985; 
Peterson et al., 2000; Wilson, 1987).  
Institutional Anomie and Competing 
Noneconomic and Economic Institutions
 By shifting focus to the institutional arrangement 
of communities, integrating institutional anomie into 
the current theoretical argument is applicable.  Messner 
and Rosenfeld (1994) revised Merton’s (1938) anomie 
perspective by shifting the foci to noneconomic institu-
tions.  This shift provided the essence of their perspec-
tive; namely, that Merton did not (a) account for anomie 
generated by a heavy reliance on economic institutional 
opportunities and (b) consider noneconomic institutions 
as a way to reduce anomie and crime.  Scholars argue 
that institutional anomie is suitable to explain macro-
level rates of violent and property crime (Messner and 
Rosenfeld, 1994:68; see also Messner and Rosenfeld, 
2001:42; Savolainen, 2000).2  At the center of institutional 
anomie are two competing dimensions -- noneconomic 
and economic institutions -- assumed to influence the 
regulatory capacity of communities.
 On one hand, noneconomic religious, political, 
welfare, and Latino cultural institutions are considered 
convention-inducing agents that foster mechanisms 
of community social control and invoke conformity. 
Researchers, for example, have posited that the social 
ecology of religious institutions is important in establish-
ing cultural norms, values of conformity, moral com-
munities, and communal goals (Messner and Rosenfeld, 
1997:74; Bainbridge, 1989; Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; 
Stark, 1996:164; Stark, Bainbridge, and Crutchfield, 1983; 
Warner, 1993).  An additional source of noneconomic 
institutional social control is the local political landscape. 
Putnam (2000) has identified voting as a key component 
of political social capital.  More recently, Rosenfeld, 
Messner, and Baumer (2001; see also Messner, Baumer, 
and Rosenfeld, 2004) noted that social capital can be the-
oretically linked with crime by drawing on institutional 
anomie’s heritage, because communities characterized by 
higher levels of political participation can influence the 
strength of community normative order.    
 While measures of poverty or some derivation 
thereof (e.g., concentrated disadvantage) have long been 
associated with crime, some researchers posit that wel-
fare institutions can reduce crime by wealth redistribu-
tion (Benoit and Osborne, 1995; Eaton and White, 1991). 
More specifically, Zhang (1997) examined the effect of 
cash and in-kind welfare programs on criminal behavior 
based on the theoretical notion that programs can reduce 
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crime.  He reported that public housing programs had 
a significantly negative effect on property crime when 
compared to Medicaid and school lunch programs. 
Goering and Feins (2003) and Sampson, Morenoff, and 
Raudenbush (2005) have recently advocated the use of 
housing vouchers to aid the poor in securing residence in 
middle class neighborhoods as a way of reducing crime 
in impoverished areas.  
 In his pioneering community-level analysis on Latino 
homicides across five U.S. cities, Martinez (2002:134) 
concluded that Latino immigrant communities create a 
buffer zone against crime by exhibiting higher levels of 
social (e.g., families, friends, church) and economic (e.g., 
work and schools) institutional integration.  This study 
extends a similar argument: communities that preserve 
the Latino culture in terms of Spanish language will also 
buffer against crime.  The Latino culture is commonly 
conceptualized as the process whereby change (e.g., lan-
guage, behavior, norms) occurs among immigrant popu-
lations (e.g., Latinos) due to exposure to and interaction 
with a cultural system (e.g., American) that is different 
from the culture of origin (Anderson and Rodriguez, 
1984; Rogler, Cortes, and Malgady, 1991).  Just as “im-
migration reinforces the cultural attributes of Latinos by 
intensifying the use of Spanish” (Martinez, 2002:39), 
Spanish speaking Latinos are more likely to reside among 
immigrants, because embedded in language is knowledge 
of customs, accesses to cultural groups, and its respective 
artifacts (Vega and Gil, 1998:128).  Therefore, Latino 
communities characterized by a dominance of the English 
language are likely to be associated with crime, because 
native cultural attributes (e.g., Spanish language) are re-
placed by norms associated with the “American Dream” 
of material wealth.  With this said, only one study has 
investigated acculturation as a contextual characteris-
tic of communities.  Using U.S. Census data, Finch et 
al. (2000) operationalized aspects of acculturation as 
household linguistic isolation and found that higher lev-
els of community acculturation had a direct relationship 
with the prevalence of substance abuse among pregnant 
Latinas.3
 On the other hand, economic institutions, such as 
bars, are likely to obstruct the development of com-
munity normative order.  For example, Peterson et al. 
(2000) relied upon physical street addresses of select 
unconventional institutions to investigate whether local 
institutions matter for controlling neighborhood violence 
and found that bars, economic deprivation, and residen-
tial instability contributed to an increase in violent crime 
across census tracts.  Interestingly, they also reported that 
the presence of recreation centers reduced violent crime 
in most economically disadvantaged neighborhoods. 
Alaniz, Cartmill, and Parker (1998; see also Roncek 
and Bell, 1981; Roncek and Maier, 1991; Roncek and 
Pravatiner, 1989; Quimet, 2000) conducted a similar 
study at the block group level across three California 
communities and reported that violence was a function 
of alcohol availability and percent divorced.  Although an 
understudied topic, researchers have empirically shown 
that pawnshop institutions also influence crime (Wright 
and Decker, 1993; Fass and Francis, 2004).  Glover and 
Larubbia (1996) posited that pawnshops are counter-pro-
ductive toward establishing normative order because they 
attract “easy money” criminals. 
Institutional Anomie’s Moderating 
Concept and Existing Empirical Studies  
 Institutional anomie theory claims that the various 
types of competing institutional dimensions matter most 
when examined in tandem.  In other words, it is the 
interaction among economic and noneconomic institu-
tions that produces the driving institutional balance of 
power concept characterized by Messner and Rosenfeld 
(2001:68).  Thus, institutional anomie is considered a 
moderating theory of crime studies (Maume and Lee, 
2003).4  Institutional anomie’s unique contribution, then, 
is that it emphasizes “the relative strength [interaction] 
between [economic and noneconomic] institutions in 
terms of the social structure” (Savolainen, 2000:1002; 
see also Bernburg, 2002:731; Messner and Rosenfeld, 
1997:1408).  Put differently, an expansion of economic 
opportunities is likely to reduce rates of crime only when 
coupled with a strengthening of noneconomic institutions 
(Messner and Rosenfeld, 2001:101; see also 1994:68-
90).     
 Institutional anomie has remained understudied when 
compared to other ecological theories; but recent em-
pirical tests have emerged.  Chamlin and Cochran (1995) 
showed the effects of economic deprivation on property 
crime were significantly lower across states with higher 
levels of church membership and percent voting while the 
effects of economic deprivation on property crimes were 
significantly higher across states with elevated levels of 
divorced families.  Savolainen (2000) reported nations 
with generous welfare programs experienced reduced 
negative effects of economic inequality (Gini coefficient) 
on homicides.  Maume and Lee (2003) estimated the in-
fluence of economic pressures (Gini coefficient) and five 
noneconomic institutions (political voter turnout, familial 
divorce rate, educational expenditure, civically engaged 
religious denominations, and welfare expenditure) and 
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found that the interaction between welfare expenditure 
and Gini was the only term to significantly moderate the 
effect of Gini on homicides across 454 counties.5              
 In summary, the literature indicated that diverse types 
of crime across various geographical aggregates can be 
explained using social disorganization and institutional 
anomie theory.  The theoretical difference is one mainly 
of emphasis -- the former aims at explaining direct and 
mediating influences while the latter aims at explaining 
moderating influences.  With this said, whether the com-
munity and institutional fabric of San Antonio influences 
crime remains an open empirical question.
Research Objectives
 The present research put forth an integrated theoreti-
cal framework aimed at providing a more holistic com-
munity-level approach explaining crime across a heavily 
populated Latino city.  Toward this end, social disorga-
nization and institutional anomie should be viewed as 
supplementary, rather than competing, theoretical frame-
works.  Three research objectives sought to (1) determine 
direct social disorganization effects on the outcomes, (2) 
better understand the effects of various institutional char-
acteristics on crime, and (3) discover whether the effect 
of concentrated disadvantage on crime depends on the 
level of economic and noneconomic institutions.  To ac-
complish these objectives, several contextual multivariate 
models were estimated, because community institutions 
will vary with respect to their ability to impose values of 
restraint and control (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2001:79).   
Data and Variables
 Several independent data sources were culled to 
construct the data file: (1) 2000 Census Bureau, (2) Texas 
Alcohol Beverage Commission (TABC), (3) San Antonio 
Police Department (SAPD), (4) Bexar County Elections 
Department, (5) San Antonio Housing Authority (SAHA), 
(6) San Antonio Catholic Archdiocese, and (7) other 
public information.  The following subsections highlight 
these data sources, along with the collection and measure-
ment procedures.
 The first source of data was the 2000 Census 
Bureau.  This source was used to carry out two broad 
functions.  The first function was to identify the unit 
of analysis -- San Antonio’s 1,016 census block groups 
(BGs).  Smaller geographic aggregates, such as BGs, may 
yield greater effects due to distinct homogeneous com-
munities (McNulty and Holloway, 2000; Peterson et al., 
2000; Simcha-Fagan and Schwartz, 1986; Quimet, 2000; 
Warner, 2003; Wooldredge, 2002).  As described in the 
variable section below, the second function was to use 
the Census Summary Tape File 3 (STF 3) to help identify 
an array of community and institutional items at the BG 
level.       
 The second data source was the Texas Alcohol 
Beverage Commission (TABC).  Consistent with prior 
research that collected alcohol outlet data (Alaniz et al., 
1998; Gyimah-Brempong, 2001; Nielsen and Martinez, 
2003; Peterson et al., 2000), the current study secured a 
list of over 1,400 “on-site” alcohol serving institutions 
(e.g., restaurants, bars, pubs, clubs) from 2001-2002.  The 
TABC provides information to the public via the Internet 
in a downloadable version. The data included each insti-
tution’s physical street address.  This made it possible to 
geocode each institution within San Antonio.
 Third, the San Antonio Police Department (SAPD) 
provided official violent (e.g., robbery) and property 
(e.g., residential burglary) crime incident records for 
calendar years 2001-2003.  At least three years of crime 
data is considered adequate to avoid annual fluctuations 
and increase the likelihood of having sufficient incidents 
to calculate reliable rates (Messner and Golden, 1992; 
Peterson et al., 2000; Sampson, 1985, 1987).  The SAPD 
data included attributes of the criminal event, such as 
date, time, incident address, and incident type.  The ad-
dress where the incident occurred was geocoded to its re-
spective BG.  The SAPD also provided physical locations 
of pawnshop and music CD-exchange stores. According 
to SAPD, there were 96 pawnshops and 30 music CD-
exchange stores.  To ensure data quality, information was 
crosschecked using the Bexar County public records and 
yellow page directory.  
 The fourth data source was election voter turnout 
information obtained from Bexar County Elections 
Department.  This department collects vital information, 
such as the physical street addresses of those who voted 
in a particular election.  During the 2000 Presidential 
election, over 415,000 votes were cast by residents of San 
Antonio.  
 The fifth data source consisted of 2000-2003 San 
Antonio Housing Authority (SAHA) Section 8 housing 
voucher information.  These data provided the physical 
address of the Section 8 home where the client resided and 
the amount of the monetary stipend the renter received to 
help pay for housing.  From 2000-2003, SAHA provided 
monetary voucher assistance to over 11,500 clients.     
 The sixth data source was 2002 church location 
and membership information.  Using the Internet, Bexar 
County public records, San Antonio Catholic Archdiocese 
official records, and yellow page directory, church loca-
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tions and membership information was collected.  Once 
a church was identified, church staff were contacted and 
asked to provide the physical street address and number of 
church members per congregation.  San Antonio has over 
650 Catholic, Lutheran, Baptist, Presbyterian, Episcopal, 
and Christian churches serving over 500,000 adherents.
 All data were geocoded to their respective BGs, pro-
ducing an analysis file of 1,016 BGs.  Population sizes 
for the BGs ranged from 226 to 4,292 individuals, with a 
mean population of approximately 1,400. 
Dependent Variables
 Two general categories of crime rates were speci-
fied as the dependent variables.  Violent crime rate was 
operationalized as the three-year (2001-2003) average of 
homicide, rape, robbery, and assault (simple and aggra-
vated) in each BG per 1,000 residents.  Property crime 
rate was measured as the three-year (2001-2003) average 
of serious property crime (auto theft and residential/ve-
hicular burglary) in each BG per 1,000 residents.  To 
reduce skewness and induce homogeneity in error vari-
ance, violent and property crime rates were transformed 
to natural logarithms.
Social Disorganization and Economic 
Institutional Independent Variables
 Social disorganization and economic institutional 
predictors were assumed to obstruct the development of 
community normative order.  Concentrated disadvantage 
was operationalized as a weighted factor regression score 
(eigenvalue = 2.85, factor loadings > .8) that included the 
following 2000 Census items: percent poverty, percent 
unemployment, percent female-headed household with 
children, percent Latino, and to a lesser extent, percent 
Black.  San Antonio is 58 percent Latino with a relatively 
small African-American (6%) population.  Concentrated 
disadvantage represented economically disadvantaged 
BGs to which Latinos and single parent families were 
concentrated.  Percent units vacant represents the propor-
tion of untended housing units within each BG.  Percent 
male 15-29 years of age was operationalized using 2000 
census data.  These three variables were hypothesized to 
be positively associated with violent and property crime 
outcomes.  The final social disorganization determinant, 
population change, was measured as the natural logged 
2000 BG population subtracted from 1990 BG popula-
tion.6  It was hypothesized that a decrease in population 
would be associated with an increase in violent and 
property crime rates, thus, a negative association was 
expected.
 The following variables represented economic 
institutional predictors.  Monetary aggravators were 
dummy coded and measured as: 1 = one or more pawn-
shop or music CD-exchange establishment in BG, 0 = no 
pawnshop or music CD-exchange establishment in BG. 
This study extended the pawnshop argument to include 
music CD-exchange stores.  Music CD-exchange stores 
trade and/or purchase merchandise (tapes, records, CDs) 
from customers.  These institutions are counterproduc-
tive because they attract “easy money” criminals that 
reflect American culture’s reliance on unconventional 
opportunities (i.e., the commission of crime) to acquire 
materialistic goals (Glover and Larubia, 1996; Chamlin 
and Cochran, 1995).  Alcohol density was operationalized 
as the number of alcohol establishments licensed for on-
site consumption (e.g., bars, taverns, pubs, restaurants) 
in each BG per 1,000 residents.  It was hypothesized that 
monetary aggravators and alcohol density would be posi-
tively associated with violent and property crime rates.     
Noneconomic Institutional Independent Variables
 The next set of variables represented noneconomic 
institutions that were assumed to invoke values of re-
straint and reinforce norms of conformity.7  Welfare 
generosity was measured as the total Section 8 housing 
dollar voucher amounts per unit in BG.  Church member-
ship rate was operationalized as the number of registered 
church members in each BG per 1,000 residents.  To cap-
ture the unique experiences that Latino communities face, 
the level of Spanish/English language usage was gauged 
in terms of retaining or losing cultural traditions as a 
group.  Knowledge of the Spanish language is positively 
related to integration with the traditional Latino culture 
(Buriel, Calzada, and Vasquez, 1982), whereas Portes 
and Rumbaut (1990) consider English language acquisi-
tion a fundamental process of becoming Americanized.8 
Latino culture was operationalized as the percentage of 
BG households linguistically isolated from the English 
language as reflected in 2000 Census data.  The aim was 
to capture the level of households that speak Spanish 
and have difficulty speaking English.  BG households 
characterized by higher levels of linguistic isolation from 
the English language (i.e., more Spanish speaking Latino 
households) were expected to be negatively associated 
with crime.  Finally, voter turnout rate was measured 
as the number of voters that participated in the 2000 
Presidential election in each BG per 1,000 residents.     
 Based on these noneconomic institutional variables, 
the following hypotheses were specified.  First, welfare 
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generosity, church membership rate, Latino culture, and 
voter turnout rate were expected to be negatively asso-
ciated with the outcomes.  Second, it was hypothesized 
that welfare generosity, church membership rate, Latino 
culture, and voter turnout rate would influence the im-
pact of social disorganization and economic institutional 
independent predictors on the outcomes.  Lastly, and 
consistent with the moderating focal point of institutional 
anomie research, it was anticipated that all noneconomic 
and concentrated disadvantage interaction terms (e.g., 
welfare generosity * concentrated disadvantage) would be 
negatively associated with the outcomes.  In keeping with 
the institutional anomie spirit, it was hypothesized that 
both economic and concentrated disadvantage interaction 
terms (e.g., alcohol density* concentrated disadvan-
tage) would be positively associated with the outcomes. 
Descriptive statistics for all variables are shown in Table 
1.  Appendix A provides a variable summary description 
along with the hypothesized relationships. 
Analytical Strategy and Findings
 Three analytical strategies were employed.  First, 
bivariate correlations were estimated to: (a) determine 
the preliminary relationships among the independent 
and dependent variables, (b) gain a better understanding 
between the theoretical social disorganization, economic, 
and noneconomic independent relationships, and (c) ad-
dress issues concerning multicollinearity.  Next, Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression was used to estimate 
several multivariate models.  In the process, diagnostic 
procedures were performed to further investigate mul-
ticollinearity, and tests for spatial autocorrelation were 
conducted.  
 Due to the spatial nature of the data, contemporary 
researchers advocate for the assessment of spatial autocor-
relation (Alaniz et al., 1998; Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003a; 
Messner et al., 2001; Nielsen and Martinez, 2003).   Using 
GeoDa software (Anselin, 2004), Moran’s I was used to 
help detect whether spatial autocorrelation was present. 
“Moran’s I is a cross-product coefficient similar to a 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient and is bounded by 1 and 
-1” (Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003b:166).  When Moran’s I is 
significantly positive, positive spatial autocorrelation is 
present.  No evidence was found to indicate that property 
(Moran’s I = .12; p > .19) and violent (Moran’s I = .10; p 
>.11) crime rate in a given BG was spatially dependent on 
adjacent BGs.9  Consistent with Reisig et al. (2004:262) 
Moran’s I was also used to investigate whether the social 
disorganization, economic and noneconomic independent 
variables yielded any significant spill-over effect across 
BGs.  While none of the independent variables achieved 
statistical significance, the largest Moran’s I coefficient 
was observed for concentrated disadvantage (.18), fol-
lowed by alcohol density (.15), and voter turnout rate 
(-.12).  Hence, no evidence of spill-over was detected.    
 Table 1 presents the bivariate correlations.  Many of 
the hypothesized relationships between the independent 
and dependent variables were significant and in the ex-
pected direction.  The general pattern of findings indicated 
that as social disorganization and other economic institu-
tional characteristics increased, violent and property crime 
rates also increased.  In contrast, as noneconomic social 
control institutions increased, violent and property crime 
rates decreased.  In terms of relative magnitude, concen-
trated disadvantage yielded the strongest correlation for 
violent crime rate, followed by alcohol density, percent 
units vacant, population change, monetary aggravators, 
and voter turnout rate.  As for property crime rate, the 
observed correlations were strongest for alcohol density, 
X1 Concentrated disadvantage
a .12 ** .13 ** -.09 ** .04 ** .07 * -.20 ** -.06 .45 ** -.30 .48 ** .24 ** 0.00 1.00
X2 Percent units vacant .09 ** -.06 .00 .03 -.01 .10 ** .08 * -.08 * .30 ** .24 ** 6.67 8.09
X3 Percent male 15-29 yrs. of age .00 .11 ** -.09 ** .06 -.04 .11 ** -.23 ** .07 * .03 10.79 5.35
X4 Population change
b -.06 -.10 ** .02 .05 -.15 ** .09 ** -.23 ** -.24 ** 1.42 2.88
X5 Monetary aggravators .02 .09 ** .07 * .04 -.04 .20 ** .22 ** 0.51 0.30
X6 Alcohol density -.03 .06 .03 -.19 ** .41 ** .44 ** 3.41 10.07
X7 Welfare generosity -.02 .05 -.09 ** -.09 * -.08 * 4777.28 9197.33
X8 Church membership rate .04 .04 -.06 -.14 * 35.09 45.50
X9 Latino culture -.17 ** -.10 * -.09 * 15.56 10.36
X10 Voter turnout rate -.15 ** -.10 * 426.79 555.23
Y Violent crime rateb .53 ** 1.70 0.78
Z Property crime rateb 3.94 1.23
a Weighted factor score
b Natural log
* p  < .05
** p  < .01
X2 X6X5X4X3 SDMean
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations
(N=1,016)
ZYX10X9X8X7
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concentrated disadvantage, percent units vacant, popula-
tion change, monetary aggravators, and church member-
ship rate.  Concentrated disadvantage was positively as-
sociated with monetary aggravators and alcohol density 
but negatively associated with welfare generosity, church 
membership rate, and voter turnout rate.   The observed 
relationship for Latino culture showed that higher levels 
of Spanish-speaking communities were disadvantaged 
with low voter turnout rates.  Overall, results indicated 
that multicollinearity was not a problem; Pearson correla-
tion values did not exceed .70. 
Multivariate OLS Regression Results – 
Property Crime Rate
 When using small aggregates, Land, McCall, and 
Cohen (1990) argued researchers need to carefully con-
trol for model specification and multicollinearity.  The 
large number of units of analysis (i.e., 1,016 census 
BGs) created a large sample of aggregates, which in 
turn allowed more macro-level predictors to be modeled 
(Wooldredge, 2002).  As a result, a total of 9 models were 
estimated.  Models 1 through 3 were additive, whereas 
4 through 9 were multiplicative.  According to Chamlin 
and Cochran (1995), additive models have little bearing 
on the evaluation of institutional anomie theory due to its 
moderating principles.  Instead, such an approach “serves 
as a baseline for the determination of the contribution of 
the joint influence [interaction] of economic conditions 
and measures of noneconomic institutions on crime” 
(Chamlin and Cochran, 1995:421).  The potential for col-
linearity was investigated further using OLS regression 
diagnostics.  Results (not shown) provided additional 
support that multicollinearity was not a problem.  None 
of the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) exceeded 4.0.  
 Table 2 presents OLS regression models for property 
crime rate.  Model 1 examined whether social disorgani-
zation positively affected property crime rate.  Consistent 
with the social disorganization hypotheses, concentrated 
disadvantage (.20) and percent units vacant (.20) were 
significantly and positively associated with the outcome; 
population change (-.21) showed a significant inverse 
relationship.  Model 1 accounted for 14 percent of the 
explained variation.  In Model 2, two economic institu-
tional variables were included in the equation.  The logic 
was that an increase in unconventional institutions may 
directly influence crime and further undermine levels of 
social control.  The findings indicated that alcohol den-
sity (.43), concentrated disadvantage (.22), monetary ag-
gravators (.20), percent units vacant (.19), and a decrease 
in population (-.16) increased property crime rates across 
BGs.  The significant and positive association for alcohol 
density and monetary aggravators support the economic 
institutional hypotheses.  The explained variation for 
Model 2 (36%) was more than double the explained 
variation in Model 1 (14%).      
 Model 3 examined whether an increase in norm 
inducing noneconomic institutions: (a) were negatively 
associated with property crime and (b) influenced the 
impact of social disorganization and economic institu-
tional conditions on the outcome.  Welfare generosity 
(-.09), church membership rate (-.07), and Latino culture 
(-.09) were significantly and negatively associated with 
property crime.  While voter turnout rate (-.02) failed to 
achieve statistical significance, its hypothesized associa-
tion was confirmed.  Next, the social disorganization and 
economic institutional predictors were assessed to detect 
attenuation in the model.  For example, the coefficient 
for concentrated disadvantage was reduced from .22 in 
Model 2 to .12 in Model 3.  Moreover, with the exception 
of alcohol density, a slight reduction was observed across 
the social disorganization and economic coefficients. 
While the findings suggest theoretically that various 
supportive and convention inducing institutions may 
help relieve resource deficient communities in ways that 
reduce crime, interpretation of the results from a purely 
statistical perspective remains inconclusive since such 
decline in magnitude of coefficients was not investigated 
statistically.  Nonetheless, the noneconomic institutional 
hypotheses were partially supported.  
 In Models 4-9, estimating procedures allowed the 
researchers to integrate both theoretical approaches by 
examining whether: (a) interactions between concentrated 
disadvantage and other crime prone economic institu-
tional predictors were positively associated with property 
crime, and (b) the influence of concentrated disadvantage 
on the outcome was moderated by noneconomic institu-
tions.  One of the central debates among institutional ano-
mie theorists (e.g., Maume and Lee, 2003:1155) is how to 
best measure economic institutions in a way that captures 
the institutional balance of power.10   Researchers have 
remained committed to using variables such as poverty (a 
deprivation measure) and Gini coefficient (an inequality 
measure) to reflect the economy (Chamlin and Cochran, 
1995; Maume and Lee, 2003; Savolainen, 2000).11  In 
doing so, scholars regularly calculate an interaction term 
that includes poverty/Gini and some other noneconomic 
institution.  Rather than rely on a single measure that cap-
tures absolute poverty or its inequality continuum equiva-
lent, the current research used concentrated disadvantage 
rooted in the social disorganization tradition.  Justification 
for this approach is that (1) concentrated disadvantage is 
Cancino, et al. / Western Criminology Review 8(1), 69–87 (2007)
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Concentrated disadvantagea .20 *** .22 *** .12 *** .13 *** .15 *** .15 *** .12 *** .18 *** .13 ***
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
  [.07]  [.07]   [.04]   [.05]   [.05]   [.05]   [.04]   [.07]  [.05]
Percent units vacant .20 *** .19 *** .18 *** .18 *** .17 *** .18 *** .18 *** .18 *** .18 ***
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
  [.01]  [.01]   [.01]   [.01]   [.01]   [.01]   [.01]   [.01]  [.01]
Percent male 15-29 yrs. of age -.01 .01 .00 .00 .02 -.01 .00 -.01 .00
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
 [-.00]  [.00]   [.00]   [.00]   [.00]   [.00]   [.00]  [-.00]  [.00]
Population changeb -.21 *** -.16 *** -.15 *** -.15 *** -.14 *** -.15 *** -.15 *** -.15 *** -.15 ***
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
 [-.02] [-.01]  [-.01]  [-.01]  [-.01]  [-.01]  [-.01]  [-.01] [-.01]
Monetary aggravators — .20 *** .18 *** .19 *** .17 *** .18 *** .18 *** .18 *** .18 ***
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) ***
 [.23]   [.21]   [.21]   [.20]   [.21]   [.21]   [.21]  [.21]
Alcohol density — .43 *** .44 *** .43 *** .45 *** .43 *** .41 *** .43 *** .43 ***
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
 [.00]   [.00]   [.00]   [.01]   [.00]   [.00]   [.00]  [.00]
Welfare generosity — — -.09 * -.09 * -.09 * -.10 * -.09 * -.09 * -.09 *
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
  [.00]   [.00]   [.00]   [.00]   [.00]   [.00]  [.00]
Church membership rate — — -.07 * -.07 * -.07 * -.07 * -.08 * -.08 * -.08 *
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
  [.00]   [.00]   [.00]   [.00]   [.00]   [.00]  [.00]
Latino culture — — -.09 * -.09 * -.04 -.09 * -.09 * -.10 * -.10 *
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
  [.00]   [.00]   [.01]   [.00]   [.00]   [.01]  [.00]
Voter turnout rate — — -.02 -.02 -.04 -.02 -.02 -.01 -.04
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
  [.00]   [.00]   [.00]   [.00]   [.00]   [.00]  [.00]
Monetary aggravators * Con dis. — — — .10 * — — — — —
(.03)   
  [.11]   
Alcohol density * Con dis. — — — — .19 *** — — — —
(.00)   
  [.00]   
Welfare generosity * Con dis. — — — — — -.11 * — — —
  (.00)
      [.00]
Church membership rate * Con dis — — — — — — -.09 * — —
(.00)
  [.00]
Latino culture * Con dis. — — — — — — — -.04 —
(.00)
 [-.01]
Voter turnout rate * Con dis. — — — — — — — — -.05
(.00)
 [.00]
Constant 3.163 *** 3.126 *** 3.107 *** 3.111 *** 3.112 *** 3.108 *** 3.104 *** 3.102 *** 3.107 ***
F-Statistic 42.09 *** 95.56 *** 61.11 *** 55.83 *** 62.64 *** 56.58 *** 55.59 *** 56.60 *** 55.52 ***
R 2 .14 .36 .38 .38 .41 .38 .38 .38 .38
Table 2. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Models for Property Crime Ratea
Model 9
�
Model 8
�
Model 7
�
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
Model 2
�
Model 1
�
Model 4
�
Model 3
�
Model 6
(N=1,016)
aWeighted factor score
bNatural log.
Standard errors in parentheses and unstandardized coefficients in brackets.
�
Model 5
�Variable
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considered a resource disadvantage measure that reflects 
an assortment of community factors (Land et al., 1990; 
Sampson and Jeglum-Bartusch, 1998), and (2) we seek to 
integrate two theoretical perspectives.  We are unaware of 
existing studies that model concentrated disadvantage as 
an interaction term.   
 To avoid problems with multicollinearity, interaction 
terms were centered (Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan, 1990). 
This practice is consistent with much of the institutional 
anomie research (e.g., Maume and Lee, 2003; Savolainen, 
2000).  The observed main effects across Models 4-9 
showed little change, further suggesting no problems with 
multicollinearity.  Model 4 specified an interaction term 
between monetary aggravators and concentrated disad-
vantage.  This interaction term was significantly and posi-
tively associated (.06) with the outcome.  Unsurprisingly, 
Model 5 indicated that the interaction between alcohol 
density and concentrated disadvantage was significant and 
positively associated (.19) with property crime rate.  Thus 
far, BGs characterized by a combination of concentrated 
resource disadvantage, pawn shops/music CD-exchange 
stores, and alcohol density were directly associated with 
the outcome.
 Models 6-9 estimated interaction terms among 
the noneconomic institutional characteristics (welfare 
generosity, church membership rate, Latino culture, 
voter turnout rate) and concentrated disadvantage.  The 
findings showed that rates of property crime were sig-
nificantly and inversely associated with BGs with higher 
levels of Section 8 welfare housing vouchers and church 
membership rate.  While interaction terms for Latino cul-
ture (-.04) and voter turnout rate (-.05) failed to achieve 
significance, their hypothesized directional relationships 
were supported.  Overall, two of the four noneconomic 
institutional interaction terms revealed evidence of mod-
erating influences.  In terms of explained variation, R2 for 
the multiplicative models were 38 percent and 41 percent 
respectively.  
Multivariate OLS Regression Results – 
Violent Crime Rate
 Table 3 presents OLS regression models for violent 
crime rate.  Similar to the results in Table 2, many of the 
specified hypotheses were supported, with three of the four 
social disorganization predictors significantly associated 
with violent crime.  Concentrated disadvantage yielded 
a much stronger positive (.44) correlation for violent 
crime, when compared to property crime in Table 2.  The 
explained variation was a healthy 32 percent.  In Model 
2, monetary aggravators and alcohol density results also 
mirrored those from Table 2.  However, the coefficient 
for monetary aggravators (.16) in the violent crime model 
was weaker, when compared to the same model (.20) in 
the previous table.  Perhaps pawnshops and music CD-
exchange stores were positively associated more with 
property than violent crime.   Nonetheless, the economic 
institutional hypotheses were confirmed to be positively 
associated with the outcome.  More interestingly, Model 
2 showed more than half (52%) of the variation in violent 
crime rate was explained.
 When noneconomic institutional variables were en-
tered in Model 3, welfare generosity (-.07), Latino culture 
(-.10), and voter turnout rate (-.08) were significant and 
negatively associated with violent crime.  These findings 
are slightly different when compared to property crime 
Model 3 in Table 2.  For example, church membership 
rate was unrelated to violent crime, but significantly and 
inversely associated to property crime.  Furthermore, 
voter turnout rate was significant and inversely related 
to violent crime, but unrelated to property crime.  Two 
possible explanations for such discrepancies were that 
some scholars posit violent crime should not be linked 
to dimensions of religion because of the impulsive and 
emotional nature of such crimes (Bainbridge, 1989; Stark, 
1987); and communities characterized by higher levels of 
voters are less likely to tolerate violence, thereby taking 
an active and more collective role in expressing disap-
proval (Messner et al., 2004).  After controlling for the 
noneconomic institutions, the observed coefficient for 
concentrated disadvantage (.40) showed a slight reduc-
tion.  Model 3 partially supported the hypotheses for 
the noneconomic variables, explaining 54 percent of the 
variation in violent crime rate.
 In Models 4-9 for violent crime, a different pattern 
of results emerged when compared to models for prop-
erty crime in Table 2.  Despite their directional accuracy, 
Models 4 and 7 indicated that a combination of monetary 
aggravators and concentrated disadvantage (.05) and 
church membership and concentrated disadvantage (-.09) 
were unrelated to violent crime.  In Models 8 and 9, the 
combination of Latino culture and concentrated disadvan-
tage (-.12) and voter turnout rate and concentrated disad-
vantage (-.10) were significant and negatively associated 
with violent crime; but in Table 2 these interaction terms 
were unrelated.  In essence, BGs characterized by con-
centrated disadvantage and alcohol density experienced 
more violent crime; less violent crime was observed in 
BGs characterized by concentrated disadvantage, welfare 
generosity, households that speak Spanish and have dif-
ficulty with English, and higher voter turnout.  The mixed 
results seen for Latino culture might suggest Latino 
Cancino, et al. / Western Criminology Review 8(1), 69–87 (2007)
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Concentrated disadvantagea .44 *** .45 *** .40 *** .36 *** .36 *** .38 *** .35 *** .42 *** .41 ***
-(.01) (.00) -(.01) -(.01) -(.01) -(.01) -(.01) -(.01) -(.01)
  [.13]  [.14]   [.10]   [.11]   [.11]   [.11]   [.11]   [.13]  [.12]
Percent units vacant .23 *** .22 *** .21 *** .21 *** .20 *** .21 *** .20 *** .20 *** .21 ***
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
  [.01]  [.01]   [.01]   [.01]   [.01]   [.01]   [.01]   [.01]  [.01]
Percent male 15-29 yrs. of age -.01 .01 .00 .00 .01 .00 .01 -.01 -.01
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
  [.00]  [.00]   [.00]   [.00]   [.00]   [.00]   [.00]   [.00]  [.00]
Population changeb -.18 *** -.13 *** -.11 *** -.11 *** -.11 *** -.11 *** -.11 *** -.11 *** -.12 ***
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
 [-.01] [-.01]  [-.01]  [-.01]  [-.01]  [-.01]  [-.01]  [-.01] [-.01]
Monetary aggravators — .16 *** .15 *** .15 *** .14 *** .14 *** .15 *** .15 .15 ***
-(.02) -(.02) -(.02) -(.02) -(.02) -(.02) -(.02) -(.02)
 [.16]   [.14]   [.15]   [.14]   [.14]   [.15]   [.15]  [.15]
Alcohol density — .42 *** .45 *** .44 *** .45 *** .44 *** .40 *** .44 *** .42 ***
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
 [.00]   [.00]   [.00]   [.01]   [.00]   [.00]   [.01]  [.01]
Welfare generosity — — -.07 * -.07 * -.07 * -.08 * -.07 * -.07 * -.07 **
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
  [.00]   [.00]   [.00]   [.00]   [.00]   [.00]  [.00]
Church membership rate — — -.05 -.05 -.05 -.05 -.05 -.05 -.05
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
  [.00]   [.00]   [.00]   [.00]   [.00]   [.00]  [.00]
Latino culture — — -.10 * -.09 * -.09 * -.10 * -.09 * .11 * -.10 *
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
  [.00]   [.00]   [.01]   [.00]   [.00]   [.01]  [.00]
Voter turnout rate — — -.08 * -.07 * -.07 * -.07 * -.08 * -.07 * -.09 *
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
  [.00]   [.00]   [.00]   [.00]   [.00]   [.00]  [.00]
Monetary aggravators * Con dis. — — — .05    ----    ----    ---- — —
-(.02)     
  [.05]     
Alcohol density * Con dis. — — — — .16 ***    ----    ---- — —
(.00)   
  [.00]   
Welfare generosity * Con dis. — — — — — -.09 *    ---- — —
(.00)
  [.00]
Church membership rate * Con dis — — — — — — -.03 — —
(.00)
  [.00]
Latino culture * Con dis. — — — — — — — -.12 * —
(.00)
 [-.01]
Voter turnout rate * Con dis. — — — — — — — — -.10 *
(.00)
 [.00]
Constant 1.396 *** 1.356 *** 1.307 *** 1.308 *** 1.300 *** 1.310 *** 1.308 *** 1.317 *** 1.363 ***
F-Statistic 117.9 *** 181.2 *** 117.0 *** 107.2 *** 110.2 *** 108.4 *** 107.0 *** 110.3 *** 109.1 ***
R 2 .32 .52 .54 .54 .55 .54 .54 .55 .55
aWeighted factor score
bNatural log.
Standard errors in parentheses and unstandardized coefficients in brackets.
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
Model 9
�
(N=1,016)
Model 7
�
Model 8
�
Model 5
�
Model 6
�Variable
Table 3. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Models for Violent Crime Ratea
Model 1
�
Model 2
�
Model 3
�
Model 4
�
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Spanish speaking households reflect immigrant commu-
nities that are capable of warding off violent crime, but 
not property crime.  In fact, San Antonio ranks second 
behind San Diego with the lowest violent crime rate in 
the U.S.  Thus, there is much more to be said and mea-
sured about the Latino experience, other than traditional 
measures such as ethnicity and race (Sampson et al., 
2005).  Overall, these findings suggest some moderating 
influence and partially support the directional accuracy of 
the interaction term hypotheses.  The explained variation 
for Models 4-9 were 54 percent and 55 percent.      
Multivariate OLS Regression Results – Summary
 In summary, OLS regression results showed five 
general patterns of findings.  First, social disorganiza-
tion determinants, especially concentrated disadvantage, 
behaved consistent with previous research.  Second, 
monetary aggravators and alcohol density appeared to 
make community matters worse by intensifying violent 
crime more than property crime.  Third, noneconomic in-
stitutional characteristics seem to adequately relieve the 
adverse social disorganization and economic institutional 
influences on crime.  Fourth, the interactions between con-
centrated disadvantage and several of the economic and 
noneconomic variables produced a mixed set of findings. 
Interactions between alcohol density and concentrated 
disadvantage, however, were significant and positively 
associated with both outcomes; interactions between wel-
fare generosity and concentrated disadvantage were also 
significant and negatively associated with both outcomes. 
Fifth, the models revealed moderate to strong explained 
variation.  Overall, the empirical evidence provides some 
merit to the proposed theoretical integration of social dis-
organization and institutional anomie, warranting further 
research.12                 
Discussion and Conclusion
 The current study incorporated the theories of social 
disorganization and institutional anomie.  The former 
was employed to tackle the demographic structure; the 
latter was enlisted to capture various types of institutions. 
Taking this approach remains attentive to the wide range 
of positive and negative community forces associated 
with crime and explores the conditional nature of crime. 
For example, the estimated interaction terms allowed 
the integration of both theories while testing whether 
substantive connections existed at the census block group 
level.  Based on the findings, both theories can be viewed 
as supplementary in order to provide a more refined 
picture that explains crime.  The findings extend the un-
derstanding of these theories when conceptualized on a 
community continuum.  At one end, more traditional de-
mographic structures exist; at the opposite end, economic 
and noneconomic institutions are present.  As researchers 
begin to identify and operationalize demographic and 
institutional forces more likely to be associated with 
crime, they can begin to assess the interdependent nature 
of these ecological characteristics.  This process adds to 
the theoretical viability and utility of each. 
 The Latino culture findings showed a significant 
negative association for property and violent crime; but 
the concentrated disadvantage-Latino culture interaction 
term suggested a tolerance for property crime and not 
violent crime.  These mixed results add to an ongoing de-
bate whether the Latino experience, in its various forms, 
impedes or improves community crime.  Researchers 
have posited two divergent perspectives.  Sampson et 
al. (1997:920) reported that higher rates of immigration 
undermine the capacity of residents to realize common 
values and to achieve informal social control due to ethnic 
and linguistic heterogeneity in Chicago (see also Flippen, 
2001:301).  However, in a more recent study, Sampson 
et al. (2005) found that lower rates of violence among 
Latinos, compared to Whites and Blacks, were explained 
by immigrant concentration.
 Martinez’s (2002) work also cast doubt on the 
hypothesis that immigration is associated with crime. 
Immigration may affect poor Latino neighborhoods posi-
tively by helping revitalize areas, strengthening traditional 
social controls, and creating new community institutions 
(Elliot and Sims, 2001:344; Buriel et al., 1982), which 
in turn reduce the likelihood of crime.  Scribner (1996) 
posits that immigrants are generally found to do as well 
and sometimes better than American citizens.  Hagan and 
Palloni (1999:631) argue future research should focus 
on the culture and religion of Mexican communities in a 
manner that emphasizes “ways to preserve, protect, and 
promote the social and cultural capital that Mexican im-
migrants bring to their experience in the United States.” 
This research sought to study the Latino experience with 
the goal of bringing Latinos to the criminological fore-
front and, in the process, move beyond the White/Black 
urban crime focus.      
 The implications of these findings are persuasive 
enough for rethinking how city officials should plan, 
implement, and coordinate economic and noneconomic 
development activities.  On one hand, this study identified 
types of criminogenic economic institutions that officials 
might regulate more closely.  For example, the fact that 
monetary aggravators and alcohol density were positively 
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associated with violent and property crime signals the 
need for regulation of such institutions through zoning. 
On the other hand, the study also identified noneconomic 
crime stabilizing mechanisms of social control in which 
officials might further invest or re-invest.  Zoning and 
land use decisions are likely to have salient consequences 
(Bursik and Grasmick, 1993:53-55).  Land use variables 
have been found to be an important correlate of crime 
(e.g., Peterson et al., 2000; Smith, Frazee, and Davison, 
2000).  By zoning, the goal is to improve the economic, 
social, cultural, and political efficacy among residents 
for the purpose of establishing community normative 
order.  According to Kubrin and Weitzer (2003a:385), it 
“is axiomatic that the priorities and decisions of munici-
pal government officials and business interest can have 
major effects on a neighborhood’s quality of life and that 
neighborhoods vary in their capacity to secure valued 
city services, but we are only beginning to understand 
how this influences crime.”  Few studies have examined 
how external political decision making influences crime 
(Stark, 1987; Stucky, 2003; Velez, 2001; Wilson, 1996).  
 With this said, however, there are three research limi-
tations.  The first limitation bears directly on the afore-
mentioned policies.  The cross sectional data preclude 
definitive statements about causal linkages between the 
independent measures and outcomes.  For example, it is 
unclear whether crime attracts bars or vise versa.  If crime 
is already present, zoning may not matter because bars are 
an extension of communities, not the cause.  This analysis 
reinforces the notion that the community-crime path is far 
from unidirectional and suggests that a complex relation-
ship exists.  To better isolate causality, future studies may 
seek to utilize cross sectional data yet employ more so-
phisticated LISREL simultaneous equation strategies that 
specify recursive and nonrecursive models (Markowitz 
et al., 2001; see also Bellair, 2000).  The second short-
coming was that the researchers were unable to measure 
key social disorganization mechanisms of social control, 
such as collective efficacy.  Third, as mentioned earlier, 
we were unable to determine whether the reduction in 
magnitude of social disorganization and economic insti-
tutional coefficients in Models 3 for property and violent 
crime rate were statistically significant; which in turn, 
rendered the evidence inconclusive that mediation exists. 
Despite these drawbacks, this research has answered the 
call of previous scholarship (e.g., Morenoff et al., 2001) 
suggesting that future ecological studies examine more 
objective institutional measures similar to those used by 
Peterson et al. (2000).  In so doing, we are optimistic that 
the greatest prospect for these ecological perspectives is 
their role and utility toward theoretical integration.
Endnotes
 1.  The authors thank Richard Rosenfeld and anony-
mous reviewers for their helpful comments and sugges-
tions. 
 2.   There is debate regarding the extent to which in-
stitutional anomie applies to violent or property crimes, 
or both.
 3.  Justification for this census item is that it “incor-
porates the level of English-language interaction for an 
entire household and subsumes important components of 
contextual census variables such as nativity and length of 
time in country” (Finch et al., 2000:429).
 4.  They argue that it is inappropriate to focus exclu-
sively on the direct relationship between economic and 
noneconomic structures and crime.
 5.  They also found that the economy (i.e., Gini coeffi-
cient of family inequality) was positively and significant-
ly related to various homicide outcomes.  Second, non-
economic familial divorce rate was positively and signif-
icantly related with homicide; voter turnout, civically en-
gaged adherents, and welfare expenditure were negative-
ly and significantly associated with homicides.   In gener-
al, voter turnout was responsible for significantly attenu-
ating the effect of economy on homicides.  Magnitudes of 
the coefficients were largest for familial divorce rate, fol-
lowed by voter turnout, civically engaged adherents, and 
welfare expenditure.
 6. Population change represents the absolute increase 
or decrease in actual population. The variable can range 
from negative to positive infinity.  The natural log can 
only be computed for positive integers. To account for 
this, computing the natural log of the absolute value nor-
malized the variable.  Once computed, the direction of the 
natural log value was changed to negative where a popu-
lation decrease was experienced.
 7.  While “direct measures of the extent to which 
noneconomic institutions provide alternative definitions 
of self-worth that could serve as countervailing forces 
against the anomie produced by the unbridled pursuit of 
the American Dream are not available,” the presumption 
here is that “certain structural arrangements [e.g., church 
membership] are more likely than others [e.g., pawn-
shops/music CD-exchange stores] to promulgate non-
materialistic values” (Chamlin and Cochran, 1995:417).
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 8.  Prior research has estimated various aspects of 
the Latino culture as an intervening and moderating vari-
able (Cuellar, Arnold, and Maldonado, 1995; Rogler et 
al., 1991:590).
 9.  The spatial weight matrix was based on rook con-
tiguity.  Rook is defined as two neighbors (e.g., census 
block groups) sharing a common boundary at the edge. 
Only those cells having a rook’s contiguous relation were 
assigned a value of 1.  
 10.  “For example, using macro-level data, how does 
one measure the dominance of the economy in the insti-
tutional balance of power, the effectiveness of noneco-
nomic institutional controls, or anomie?” (Chamlin and 
Cochran, 1995:415).
 11.  Cochran et al. (1995) estimated poverty in their 
primary models, but also substituted poverty with the 
Gini coefficient to determine differential effects.  The 
outcome yielded similar results.  In contrast, Maume and 
Lee (2003) estimated the Gini coefficient in their original 
model, but then substituted the Gini coefficient with pov-
erty.  Maume and Lee (2003:1154) also reported that the 
results were “identical to the ones [with the Gini coeffi-
cient].”  The lack of variation in results is perhaps due to 
the fact that such concepts are theoretically distinct, but 
may share similar qualities when operationalized.
 12.  As one reviewer suggested, results should be in-
terpreted with caution since concentrated disadvantage: 
(1) includes outputs of the economy (poverty and un-
employment) as well as family structure (female-head-
ed households with children) and (2) incorporates Latino 
population which makes interpretation of the net effect of 
Latino culture less precise.
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Variable +/- Operational definition
Violent crime rate Three year (2001-2003) average of homicide, rape, robbery, and assault (simple and
aggravated) in each BG per 1,000 population. Natural logs were computed to
normalize the distribution.
Property crime rate Three year (2001-2003) average of serious property crime (auto theft, residential
burglary, and vehicular burglary) in each BG per 1,000 population. Natural logs were
computed to normalize the distribution.
Concentrated disadvantage + Weighted factor regression score that included the following 2000 Census items:
percent poverty, percent unemployment, percent female-headed household with
children, percent Latino, and to a lesser extent, percent Black.
Percent units vacant + Percent BG housing units vacant.
Percent males 15-29 years o + Percent BG population males between ages 15-29.
Population change - Natural logged 2000 BG population subtracted from 1990 BG population.
1 = One or more pawnshop or music CD-exchange store establishment in BG.
0 = No pawnshop or music CD-exchange store establishment in BG.
Alcohol density + Number of on-site (in-house) consumption alcohol establishments (e.g., bars, taverns,
pubs, restaurants) in each BG per 1,000 population.
Welfare generosity - Total Section 8 housing dollar voucher amounts per unit in BG.
Church membership rate - Number of registered church members in each BG per 1,000 population.
Latino culture - Percent BG households linguistically isolated. The census defines “linguistically
isolated” household as those in which no person 14 years old and over speaks only
English and no person 14 years old and over who speaks a language other than English
speaks English "Very well".
Voter turnout rate - Number of participated voters in each BG per 1,000 population.
Monetary aggravators +
Appendix A. Operational Definitions of Dependent and
Independent Variables and Hypothesized Relationships
